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Following are excerpts from the recently-published book, "Inside Honduras: The Essential Guide
to its Politics, Economy, Society and Environment." The book, authored by LADB political affairs
editor Kent Norsworthy, was published by the Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center.
(Order information can be obtained from the Resource Center, Box 4506, Albuquerque, NM, 87196).
The excerpts provide background elements essential for understanding military reform initiatives
which have been sweeping Honduras since early this year (see CAU 02/26/93, 03/12/93, 03/19/93):
Following decades of intermittent direct rule by the armed forces, the army formally returned
to its barracks in 1981. The deal to allow civilians to run the government turned out to be a good
one for the armed forces. Behind the veneer of elected governments, and despite the fact that the
country was neither at war nor facing an internal insurgency, the 1980s witnessed an unprecedented
build-up of the Honduran armed forces. Between 1978 and 1984 US military aid increased more
than twenty-fold, while the armed forces doubled in size. Equally important as this quantitative
expansion, during the 1980s the military consolidated its grip on the key levers of national policy
formulation and decision making. As one observer put it, "The military has all the power and the
civilians have all the problems." But by the early 1990s, even the well-entrenched Honduran military
establishment was finding it hard to remain sheltered from the winds of change sweeping the
region. As the Central American conflagration of the 1980s receded further into the background, the
military's central role in Honduran society looked more and more anachronistic. Likewise, civilian
politicians interested in pursuing political reforms and democratization within the Honduran
state increasingly saw the longstanding tradition of military autonomy as a hindrance to their
plans. Roots of the Honduran Military In Honduras, as in much of Latin America, today's military
institutions trace their roots to paramilitary groups that traditionally fulfilled two essential functions.
First, groups of armed men were formed and then supported by political parties, sectors of the
oligarchy, and in the case of Honduras, the US banana companies, with the objective of assuring the
installation of favored individuals in the presidency. Second, these same groups served effectively
as a police force to squelch worker and campesino unrest, usually on the basis of personal relations
between a local barracks commander and the plantation or factory owner. The first major efforts
to transform what had started out as armed groups supporting one or another elite faction into a
unified, standing military force responding to national objectives took place during the dictatorship
of Gen. Tiburcio Carias (1932-48). In 1946, the Carias regime created the country's first separate
armed force charged specifically with police functions a body that eventually evolved into the
Public Security Force (FUSEP). Efforts at modernization and professionalization of the emerging
Honduran military, including establishment of the nation's first military academy in 1952, were
further consolidated during the National Party government of Juan Manuel Galvez (1949-54). The
process of modernizing the Honduran military was further intensified after 1954 when the US
concluded a Bilateral Military Assistance Treaty and sent Army and Air Force missions to train and
equip their Honduran counterparts. In the most immediate sense, the treaty was part of US efforts
aimed at securing Honduran assistance in the campaign to overthrow the Arbenz government in
neighboring Guatemala. But in the larger picture, the treaty was but one element of a larger project
that sought to complete the transformation of what had been a gendarme for US fruit companies
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and the Honduran oligarchy into an autonomous, professional institution that would serve US
designs. On-site training and scholarships to US military schools along with modest financial
support characterized the relationship prior to the military expansion of the 1980s. Structure of the
Armed Forces In Honduras, the process of militarization defined not as the quantitative build-up of
the armed forces and its weaponry but rather as the encroachment of military practices and control
on civil daily life stretches back many years. The Constitution of 1957 eliminated civilian authority
over the military, transferring ultimate control of the institution to the chief of the armed forces,
who was given the right to disobey presidential orders that he considered unconstitutional. The
constitution also afforded the armed forces an active role in politics, assigning them the specific
function of ultimate guardians of the constitutional order. That meant that the armed forces could
step in any time they felt the constitution was being violated. The essential elements of military
autonomy from civilian authority were maintained in the 1982 Constitution. Such formal authority
provided a legal basis for the political independence and autonomous institutional development
of the military and set the stage for its subsequent incursions into all areas of national affairs. This
process has been facilitated by the long-standing atomization and weakness of the Honduran
political parties, state, and oligarchy, and by the tradition among social and political groups of
turning to the military for support. In much of the countryside, local military commanders wield
more influence than civilian authorities. In many remote areas the army is the only representative
of the central government. At the national level the military has long played the role of ultimate
arbiter of disputes between rival political, social, and economic forces... Structurally, the armed
forces are divided into four major branches: the army, the air force, the navy, and FUSEP. All four
branches are controlled by the military's Superior Council of the Armed Forces (COSUFFAA).
Although the bulk of police and internal security functions reside with FUSEP and the police forces
it controls, the army is also used extensively for these purposes, especially in the countryside. In
any case, unlike in many countries where the police and army are institutionally separate forces, in
Honduras they are merely different appendages of the same body. This means that the Honduran
military has an absolute monopoly on the "legitimate" use of armed force in the country. Estimates
of the total number of full-time members of the combined armed forces range from 23,700 to 30,000.
The army expanded from a few thousand troops in the 1970s to an estimated 15,000 by 1989. With
the addition of two new brigades in 1989, one artillery and one infantry, the army now has five
such units stationed around the country. Although much of Honduras is rugged, mountainous
territory, the army's arsenal includes some 90 tanks. Led by a squadron of 37 combat jets out of a
total fleet of 120 aircraft, the Honduran air force is considered the most powerful in Central America.
Washington's repeated stalling on delivery of a promised dozen F-5 supersonic jet fighters the last
being delivered in January 1990 became a longstanding point of friction between the two countries.
With a smaller and less combat-hardened army than either Guatemala, El Salvador, or Nicaragua,
the Honduran military regards superiority in air power as indispensable. In contrast to other Central
American countries' use of air power merely to support ground-based counterinsurgency efforts, the
Honduran air force is equipped and trained for offensive operations against installations in other
countries. The naval force, essentially a coast guard, is unimposing and comprises only a handful
of small patrol boats. It is, however, the focus of increased attention under the aegis of the war on
drugs as a key interdiction force along the country's extensive maritime coasts. FUSEP is controlled
by army officers and is subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, although it has its own general
staff and a separate organizational structure. In addition to its regular police units, FUSEP controls
the treasury police, the traffic police, and a counterinsurgency unit known as the Cobras. The
Honduran equivalent of the FBI, the National Investigations Division (DNI), formed in 1976, is also
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formally under the control of FUSEP. The DNI carries out routine criminal detective work, as well
as surveillance and intelligence operations. In total, some 4,500 members of various police forces are
managed by FUSEP. The intelligence section of the armed forces, known as the G-2 and functioning
under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is primarily responsible for keeping tabs on political
opponents and military personnel. This secret police unit in turn created and operates Battalion 3-16
and carries out propaganda campaigns against domestic opposition groups, critics, and dissenters.
Although Battalion 3-16 is directed by intelligence officers, it recruits its operatives from numerous
forces such as FUSEP, the DNI, and the immigration service. These operatives remain at their jobs
as a cover to restrict knowledge of the unit's existence even within the military. Faced with an everexpanding crime rate during the early 1990s, many groups called on the military to scale down the
size of the standing army in order to transfer personnel and budget outlays to FUSEP's police forces.
Others, anxious to break the military's monopoly on the use of force, argued that FUSEP should
be subordinated to the judiciary, not the armed forces. Neither proposal received much backing
from the high command. The armed forces also control several additional institutions adjunct to the
miltiary's major branches. Most important among these are the dozens of military academies and
schools scattered around the country for the training of both recruits and officers. The active duty
armed forces are also supplemented by stand-by and general reserve groups. The military has its
own internal judicial system and, by way of a clause in the Constitution, has traditionally claimed
jurisdiction over all "military matters," including crimes committed by active duty personnel against
civilians. The military also controls, via power of appointment, the national telecommunications
system, immigration services, and the merchant marine. In all branches of the military, officers
tend to come from the middle classes and achieve their commissions through academies rather
than by rising through the ranks. As a result, rivalries and divisions within the armed forces tend
to follow lines of shared "promotions" or graduating classes more than political or ideological
factors...For those who enter as officers, the military is an important mechanism for social climbing.
The privileges that officer status provides, along with opportunities for graft and corruption, often
result in quick and dramatic fortunes. Numerous Honduran officers have acquired property or a
stake in agroexport industries either through illicit appropriation of state lands or as gifts received
from grateful landowners. In part because being an officer in Honduras provides such attractive
economic and social opportunities, the miltiary has become top heavy, with over 300 officers above
the rank of major in a force of fewer than 30 battalions... Although much of the military build-up
of the 1980s was bankrolled by the US military assistance program, defense spending consistently
devoured between 20% and 30% of the national budget. During the early 1990s, intense pressures
were brought to bear on the military establishment to reduce spending. Cuts in US aid levels, the
prevailing atmosphere of fiscal austerity, popular pressures for demilitarization, and even direct
pressure brought to bear by the World Bank and the US embassy constituted a powerful incentive to
at least begin taming the military appetite. Nonetheless, the high command tenaciously resisted any
allocation reduction. Yet even for the Honduran generals, the writing on the walls was clear. One of
the strategies they pursued to assure the long-term predominance of the military establishment, and
to provide a buffer from future political and economic changes within the Honduran government,
was to solidify the armed forces' role as a major economic player in its own right. Armed forces'
holdings include a controlling stake in insurance, investment, credit card, and real estate companies,
as well as ownership of the San Miguel Archangel funeral parlor. They also have investments in
the cereal, clothing, and footwear industries. In mid-1991, a major public scandal erupted when
the Military Social Security Institute (Instituto de Prevision Military, IPM) submitted the winning
bid in privatization of the state-run Honduran Cement Industry (INCEHSA). Honduran private
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businesspeople were outraged, arguing that selling a government industry to the military was
hardly "privatization" and even tried to have the deal annulled on grounds that government
revenues, in the form of salaries for military personnel, were being used to purchase INCEHSA.
Yet despite the protests, the deal was allowed to stand. The IPM, in addition to its highly profitable
cement works, also controls the armed forces own bank (Banco de las Fuerzas Armadas), a securities
firm, and factories where military uniforms and gear are manufactured. The IPM is not required to
make public its earnings... Current armed forces chief Gen. Luis Alonso Discua who assumed the
post in December 1990 has presided during a period of unprecedented pressures for changing the
military establishment's role in society. Those pressures had been building for years, the product
of a complex web of factors. As social and economic situation of the country deteriorated, it became
increasingly common for attention to be focused on military abuses and excesses. According to
Manuel Gamero, editor of El Tiempo daily newspaper: "The military is viewed here as the single
most important force in the country's life. When the economy and the political system don't deliver,
the military is held responsible. This growing popular digruntlement has made the military even
more willing to turn against its US benefactor, hoping to deflect attention from its own role." Discua
had only been in office for six months when the case of Riccy Mabel Martinez rocked the nation
and the armed forces. Martinez, a young student from a Tegucigalpa teachers training school,
was brutally tortured, raped and murdered in July 1991. In the face of overwhelming evidence
implicating two military officers in the crime, unprecedented pressures brought to bear by the
US embassy, and in part to defuse a public outcry that threatened to become uncontrollable,
the Honduran government decided to encourage civilian courts to try the two officers. Despite
steadfast resistance on the part of some in the armed forces, a subsequent cover-up campaign,
and attempts to tamper with evidence in the case, the two were eventually turned over to civilian
authorities for trial, albeit after having received discharges in order to avoid a precedent- setting
prosecution of active-duty officers. Nonetheless, the case appeared to mark the beginning of the
end of the longstanding tradition of military impunity in Honduras. In the words of Honduran
political analyst Victor Meza, the Martinez case was crucial in that it "permitted anti- militarism
to become public. The army is no longer a taboo subject." Less than one month after the Martinez
murder, Innovation and Unity Party (PINU) deputy Carlos Sosa introduced a bill in Congress
aimed at instituting a series of reforms designed to ultimately subordinate the armed forces to the
civilian government. Sosa's bill, a similar proposal discussed within the armed forces leadership,
and reportedly yet another version sponsored by the US embassy, all aspired to reducing the powers
attached to the post of armed forces chief, transferring most of that authority to a civilian-appointed
defense minister, and designating the Honduran president as military commander in chief. Under
these bills, COSUFFAA, the deliberative body overseeing the military in conjunction with the
armed forces chief, would be reduced in size and importance. Another aspect of the proposed
reforms would eliminate the current practice of budget secrecy within the armed forces, forcing
the military to open its books to outside scrutiny and subjecting it to the same fiscal regulations as
other elements of the Honduran state. In the words of Carlos Sosa: "Now, there is no excuse for
allowing the military a hegemonic role in politics. [The proposed reforms] are basic...they exist in
every democratic country in the world."

-- End --
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